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1. Introduction 
 
When a debtor runs into financial problems and starts neglecting to satisfy his financial 
obligations as and when they fall due, there are various statutory procedures or remedies 
available to both the debtor and his creditor(s).  The first and most obvious remedy available 
to the creditor is to demand the satisfaction of the outstanding claim by the issuance of a 
letter of demand, followed by a summons and subsequent court proceedings in which the 
creditor will claim what is due to him.
1
  If the debtor still neglects to satisfy the judgement 
debt, the creditor may proceed to have the judgement enforced by means of a warrant of 
execution in terms of which the debtor’s property will be attached and be sold at a public 
auction.
2
  Another procedure that is available is for either party to apply for a sequestration 
order in terms of the Insolvency Act.
3
  The Insolvency Act provides for two ways in which a 
debtor’s estate may be sequestrated.  These two ways have their own separate requirements.  
The two ways are: 
1. Voluntary surrender; and 
2. Compulsory sequestration.4 
 
Voluntary surrender entails a situation where the debtor himself applies to court to have his 
previously issued notice of surrender
5
 accepted by the court.  Voluntary surrender is dealt 
with in section 3 of the Insolvency Act.  Compulsory sequestration, on the other hand, entails 
a situation where a debtor’s creditor or creditors applies to court for the sequestration of the 
debtor’s estate.  Compulsory sequestration is dealt with in section 9 of the Insolvency Act.6 
 
A procedure available only to the debtor is offered by the National Credit Act,
7
 namely to be 
declared over-indebted and/or that a credit agreement to which the debtor is a party be 
declared an instance of reckless credit granting.
8
  The effect of such a declaration of over-
                                                          
1
 Bertelsmann et al Mars: The Law of Insolvency in South Africa (9
th
 ed) 1. 
2
 Theophilopoulos et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure (2006) 347. 
3
 24 of 1936. 
4
 Sharrock et al Insolvency Law (8
th
 ed) 15. 
5
 The notice of surrender must state the full names, address and occupation of the debtor; the date when and the 
division of the high court which will hear the application and when and where the debtor’s statement of affairs 
will be available for inspection. 
6
 Sharrock et al (n 4) 15. 
7
 34 of 2005. 
8
 JM Otto and R-L Otto The National Credit Act Explained (2013) 4. 
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indebtedness is that the debtor may have his debts rearranged or have his obligations set aside 
or suspended in the case of a declaration of reckless credit.   
 
The focus of this dissertation will be to discuss the effect that the National Credit Act may 
have on insolvency proceedings instituted in terms of the Insolvency Act.  There is a certain 
amount of overlap between the provisions of these two acts because they both set out to 
regulate the position of persons who are experiencing financial difficulties.  Both acts set out 
various alternative procedures which are available to both the debtor and creditor and thus the 
provisions and the applications of both acts may overlap in some instances and conflict in 
others. 
 
This dissertation will begin by looking at the purposes of both acts and then it will move on 
to see to whom the acts apply.  The dissertation will then move to discuss the relevant 
concepts in both acts, such as voluntary surrender, compulsory sequestration and over-
indebtedness. It will then investigate whether or not the court may, during sequestration 
proceedings, refer the debtor to a debt counsellor to determine if the debtor is over-indebted 
and whether he should consequently be entitled to the remedies offered by the National 
Credit Act.  Finally, this dissertation will investigate whether or not the letter that is sent out 
by a debt counsellor, when a debtor applies for debt review, amounts to an act of insolvency.  
If this were to be the case then credit providers may, upon the receipt of the letter from the 
debt counsellor, apply for the sequestration of the debtor.  This state of affairs has been on the 
increase in practice in recent times as can be seen from the recent spate of court cases arising 
in various divisions of the high court. 
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2. Purposes of the respective acts 
2.1 Purposes of the National Credit Act 
 
The starting point of any discussion regarding the purposes of the National Credit Act would 
most certainly have to be the purposes section as found in that specific act.  Thereafter we 
must examine just how the courts have interpreted that purposes section in practice.  Prior to 
examining those purposes, it would be appropriate, at this juncture, to discuss the 
interpretation section of the National Credit Act.  The National Credit Act clearly stipulates 
that: “This Act must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in 
section 3.”9  From this section it is clear just how important the purposes section becomes.  It 
is so important because it colours how we must interpret the entire act.  Otto, in his analysis 
of the act, expresses the import of the purposes section by stating that: “Its provisions are not 
a hollow statement of nice-sounding ideals; section 3 has an effect on the interpretation of all 
the provisions in the act.”10  Thus, the import of the purposes section should never be 
understated.  The purposes section in the National Credit Act is found in section 3 and 
provides as follows: 
 
“The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, 
efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers, 
by- 
a) promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, 
and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit under 
sustainable market conditions; 
b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit providers; 
c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by- 
i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and fulfilment 
of financial obligations by consumers; and 
ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default 
by consumers; 
                                                          
9
 s 2(1) of the NCA. 
10
 Otto et al (n 8) 6. 
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d) promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers; 
e) addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and 
credit providers by- 
i) providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights; 
ii) providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in 
order to make informed choices; and 
iii) providing consumers with protection from deception, and from unfair or 
fraudulent conduct by credit providers and credit bureaux; 
f) improving consumer credit information and reporting and regulation of credit bureaux; 
g) addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing mechanisms 
for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer 
of all responsible financial obligations; 
h) providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements; and 
i) providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement 
and judgment, which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible 
consumer obligations under credit agreements.”11 
 
The most interesting purpose to take note of is listed in section 3(d) of the National Credit 
Act.  It calls for the promotion of equity in the credit market by balancing the respective 
rights and responsibilities of credit providers and consumers.  This is a rather interesting 
purpose for a piece of legislation that is generally considered to be a piece of consumer 
protection legislation.
12
  While it rings melodious to the ear of the credit provider to be 
afforded such wide protection in the purposes section of the act, if it is not backed up in 
practice by the courts, the purpose becomes nothing more than a “hollow statement of nice 
sounding ideals.”13  Originally, however, the high courts were divided as to how the purposes 
of the National Credit Act should be interpreted.  At the outset, the high court seemed to 
ignore the interests of the credit provider in favour of a pro-consumer stance.  This can 
                                                          
11
 s 3(a) to (i) of the NCA. 
12
 Otto “The history of consumer credit legislation in South Africa” 2010 Fundamina 257 257. 
13
 Otto et al (n 8) 6. 
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clearly be seen from the judgement in the case ABSA Bank v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara 
Interiors
14
 where it was held that: 
 
“As stated earlier in this judgement, this Act is structured and designed more for the 
protection of the consumer than the credit provider, and it seems more so than in the case 
of other credit-consumer legislation.  There is ample justification, therefore, that a stricter 
interpretation is warranted than in the case of previous legislation of this kind.”15 
 
While the Prochaska case seemed to ignore the expressly listed purpose set out in section 
3(d) of the National Credit Act in favour of an interpretation that the National Credit Act is a 
piece of consumer protection legislation where very little consideration is given to the 
interests of the credit provider, other courts have justifiably taken the interests of the credit 
provider into consideration when interpreting the purpose of the National Credit Act.  This 
can be seen from the apt quote taken from the case of Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Hales:
16
 
 
“Since section 3 lists a number of purposes, it cannot be that the protection of consumers 
is the sole purpose.  Neither can it be said that this is the chief purpose.  No prioritisation 
is provided.  A number of the listed means by which the purposes are to be achieved 
include the protection of consumers but not all do so.  Others include a balancing of rights 
and responsibilities of consumers and credit providers as well as enforcement of debt.  
Whilst consumer protection is a clear object, it is one factor, albeit a very important one, 
in the purposes of the Act.”17 
 
Clearly consumer protection is an important purpose; but the consumer is not the only party 
involved in the matter and the Act affords credit providers a measure of protection.  Credit 
providers perform a very important role in society, one that a growing society could not do 
without.  Ignoring the interests of the credit provider and imposing numerous costs on the 
credit provider to provide credit to the public or onerous terms of conditions to which credit 
providers must comply, might result in credit providers choosing not to offer credit at all.  In 
Firstrand Bank Ltd v Seyffert
18
 the court stated as much when it said that: 
                                                          
14
 2009 2 SA 512 (D). 
15
 par 56. 
16
 2009 3 SA 315 (D & C). 
17
 par 13. 
18
 2010 6 SA 429 (GSJ). 
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“It is clear from reading section 3 of the National Credit Act, which sets out the purposes 
of the Act, that it pursues varied objectives which must be held in balance.  Certainly, the 
National Credit Act is designed to protect consumers, but it was not intended to make of 
South Africa a “debtors paradise”.  Indeed, a “debtors paradise” will not last for long.  
Very soon credit would not be available to ordinary people.  Sight must not be lost of the 
fact that among the purposes of the Act is the ‘development of a credit market that is 
accessible to all South Africans’.  It should be remembered that access to responsibly 
granted credit, on fair and reasonable terms, is an important means of social upliftment 
for ordinary citizens.  It also needs to be borne in mind that responsibly granted credit has 
a ‘multiplier effect’ in an economy.”19 
 
I believe the court in the aforementioned Seyffert case has given us the best explanation of 
how the purposes of the National Credit Act should be interpreted.  The court acknowledged 
the need to protect consumers but understood that this must be balanced by considering the 
interests of the credit provider.  Far too often the role and import of the credit provider in a 
society is diminished in favour of a near-sighted consumer protection view.  This is all good 
and well, however, such a near-sighted view ignores the very important role that credit 
provision plays in a growing economy.  The court in the Seyffert case used the example of a 
person who borrows money from a bank in order to build a house.
20
  The money borrowed is 
then used to pay the builders, jobs are created and the economy grows thereby.  The money is 
also used to buy the building materials which are then subsequently used to pay the wages of 
the workers who produced the building materials.  The money borrowed from the credit 
provider to build the house will, in one form or another, find its way back to the bank and be 
lent out again.  This is how the “multiplier effect” works in practise.  It is interesting that 
economic theory has long since devised a simple calculation to determine the effect of this 
multiplier on money supply.  The relevant calculation is as follows: 
 
  Multiplier effect = 1 / Reserve requirement
21
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 par 10. 
20
 par 10. 
21
 Chetty et al Fundamental economic theory. A basic approach for South African students (2005) 233. 
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Thus, if a bank has a reserve requirement
22
 of 20%, that bank could offer up to five times that 
amount of money into the economy.  Growth in a modern economy requires credit provision 
by financial institutions since very few natural persons could afford to buy houses or even 
cars without some sort of credit provision.  Similarly very few juristic persons could afford to 
engage in most growth activities without credit provision.  Thus, the role that credit 
provider’s play in society, especially in a growing economy such as South Africa’s, cannot be 
understated and should not be diminished lightly. 
 
There is thus a very clear link between consumers and credit providers.  Increasing the cost of 
compliance by imposing onerous terms and conditions for credit provision will either cause 
the credit provider to shift the increased cost of compliance to the consumer, thereby 
increasing the cost of credit or it will simply cause the credit provider to apply more stringent 
terms for the granting of credit to consumers – with the result that less consumers will be able 
to access the credit on offer.  Increasing the cost of credit or making credit more difficult to 
acquire will have a catastrophic effect on the economy as a whole.  It would mean that a 
financial institution would not provide as much credit to consumers as they could, this would 
lead inexorably to less spending in the public and private sector, resulting in less jobs created; 
the end result being that in certain cases jobs would be lost and in extremis an economic 
recession could occur.  In the end it would just mean that the consumer would be in a worse 
off position than when they started.  Thus, if we were really trying to protect consumers, we 
would have to take into account the effect of any action, or decisions of the courts, on the 
credit providers.  To simply increase the cost of compliance for credit providers is near 
sighted and could do more harm to consumers than good. 
 
We must always keep this link between credit providers and consumers in mind and we 
should expect the constitutional court to do the same.  In the latest decision of the 
constitutional court in Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa
23
 the court was required, inter 
alia, to decide on the delivery and proof of delivery of section 129 notices.  The previous 
position, as decided by the supreme court of appeal, was that the mere despatch of a section 
129 notice, in the manner chosen by the consumer, was sufficient to establish compliance 
                                                          
22
 Portion of their deposits that banks and savings institutions are required to maintain as legal reserves for the 
protection of depositors.  Reserve requirements also provide one of the monetary adjustment tools that 
governments can use to regulate the supply of credit in the banking system.   
23
 2012 5 SA 142 (CC). 
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with the act and that actual receipt of the notice is the consumer’s responsibility.24  This is a 
seemingly fair position for both parties involved, the consumer is free to choose a method of 
delivery for the section 129 notice and the credit provider does not have to incur too many 
costs to send the notice.  The important link between the parties’ interests is maintained.  
However, the majority of the court in the Sebola case decided that whenever a credit provider 
enforces a credit agreement they must make averments that would satisfy a court on a balance 
of probabilities that the notice was received by the consumer.
25
  In practice this would entail 
that a credit provider would have to obtain a post-despatch “track and trace” print-out from 
the South African Post Offices’ website.26  At first glance this seems to be positive for 
consumers, however if we analyse this decision a little closer it seems that the decision may 
yet have the opposite effect.  From my perspective, the Sebola decision will have one of two 
outcomes.  Firstly, the extra cost of obtaining a post-despatch “track and trace” will somehow 
be directed to the consumer and cause the cost of credit to increase; thereby resulting in fewer 
people being able to afford credit.  The second effect which I can foresee is that credit 
providers may simply insist that all consumers who apply for credit either have email 
addresses or facsimile machines to which the section 129 notices can be sent.  This too is not 
a great position for the poorer sector of society who cannot afford such costly methods of 
communications.  Similarly this will also lead to less credit being offered – or credit only 
being offered to certain segments of the community – which is in contrast to section 3(a) of 
the act which aims at ensuring broader access to credit.  Both outcomes will lead to 
consumers being worse off in the long run. 
 
2.2 Purposes of the Insolvency Act 
 
The primary source of South African insolvency law is the Insolvency Act.  Thus it would be 
appropriate for us to analyse the Act and appropriate court decisions to try and glean the 
purpose of insolvency law.  Traditionally the purpose of the Insolvency Act and sequestration 
proceedings have been focussed on the interests of the creditor, giving very little attention to 
the interests of the debtor.
27
  The primary object of the Insolvency Act is not to grant the 
                                                          
24
 Rossouw v First Rand Bank Ltd 2010 ZASCA 130 at par 31. 
25
 par 75. 
26
 par 76. 
27
 Sharrock et al (n 4) 4. 
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debtor a procedure whereby his debts may be relieved; the purpose of the Insolvency Act is to 
provide the creditors, as a group, with a debt collecting process that will ensure the orderly 
and fair distribution of the debtor’s assets in the situation where the value of the debtor’s 
assets is insufficient to satisfy all the creditors’ claims.28  The purpose of the Insolvency Act 
was explained in the oft quoted case of Walker v Syfret:
29
 
 
“The object of the [Insolvency Act] is to ensure a due distribution of assets among 
creditors in the order of their preference . . . The sequestration order crystallises the 
insolvent’s position; the hand of the law is laid upon the estate, and at once the rights of 
the general body of creditors have to be taken into consideration.  No transaction can 
thereafter be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single creditor to the prejudice 
of the general body.  The claim of each creditor must be dealt with as it existed at the 
issue of the order.”30 
 
From the above it becomes clear that the courts have interpreted the purpose of the 
Insolvency Act in a very pro-creditor manner.  Not once in the oft quoted section are any of 
the interests of the debtor considered or even so much as mentioned.  No consideration is 
given to the impact that the sequestration order may have on the debtor’s interests such as his 
employment or the valuation of his assets.  However, as we can see, the traditional 
interpretation of the purpose of the Insolvency Act focuses mainly on the interests of the 
creditor and more specifically on the interests of the general body of creditors in getting paid.  
The purpose of the Insolvency Act was restated in the same vein in many court decisions.  An 
example of such a restatement was the concise statement of the court in R v Meer
31
 where the 
court held that: “[T]he Insolvency Act was passed for the benefit of creditors and not for the 
relief of harassed debtors.”32 33 
 
The requirement for voluntary surrender of “advantage to creditors” in section 6(1) and the 
requirement for compulsory sequestration of “there is reason to believe that it will be to the 
advantage of creditors if his estate is sequestrated” in section 12(1) is further proof of the pro-
creditor nature of traditional South African insolvency law. 
                                                          
28
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 2. 
29
 1911 AD 141. 
30
 at 166. 
31
 1957 (3) SA 614 (N). 
32
 at 619. 
33
 In Ex parte Pillay 1955 (2) SA 309 (N) at 311 the same conclusion was reached with respect to the purpose of 
the Insolvency Act. 
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However, since the late 1970s, many countries have started to adopt a new attitude toward 
insolvency law.  This reformative process was started by the United States of America 
through the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
34
  This act forsakes the 
pure sequestration model whereby the focus is mainly on attaching all of the debtor’s assets 
in order to pay all of his creditors.
35
  The act attempts to achieve varied purposes such as 
paying of creditors, preserving the debtor’s employment and ensuring that the debtor has the 
means necessary to make a fresh start.
36
  Thus, American insolvency law focuses upon 
looking after all the interests affected by the debtor’s insolvency, with no single purpose 
dominating.
37
   
 
The USA was not the only country to adopt insolvency legislation that was modelled upon 
the aforesaid.  During the 1980s and 1990s several northern European countries passed 
legislation based on the American “fresh start” model.38  The two most famous examples of 
countries adopting a “fresh start” - like approach are the Dutch and English law approach.39  
From the worldwide adoption of these broader socially centred aims, insolvency law that still 
applies a pure sequestration model, as in South Africa, might require a rethink. 
 
This rethink of the law of insolvency in South Africa came in the form of a committee 
appointed in 1987 by the South African Law Commission.
40
  The result of the committee’s 
enquiries was a series of working papers, reports and eventually the publication of the Draft 
Insolvency Bill and explanatory memorandum in 2000.
41
  Upon a careful examination of the 
Draft Insolvency Bill, it appears that the South African Law Reform Commission has taken 
notice of international developments and the general acceptance of the American “fresh start” 
approach.
42
  The commission has accepted as a starting point that bona fide debtors should be 
afforded the opportunity to make a “fresh start” after they have been sequestrated and that a 
balance should be maintained between the interests of debtors and creditors.
43
  While nothing 
                                                          
34
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 4. 
35
 Rochelle “Lowering the penalties for failure: using the insolvency law as a tool for spurring economic growth; 
the American experience, and possible uses for South Africa” 1996 TSAR 315 317. 
36
 Rochelle (n 35) 317. 
37
 Rochelle (n 35) 318. 
38
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 4. 
39
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 4. 
40
 Boraine and van der Linde “The draft Insolvency Bill – an exploration (part 1)” 1998 TSAR 621 622. 
41
 Evans, Loubser and van der Linde “Aspects of the Draft Insolvency Bill” 1999 SA Merc LJ 210 210. 
42
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 5. 
43
 Bertelsmann et al (n 1) 5. 
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has come of the Draft Insolvency Bill as yet, we can clearly see that there has been a shift in 
the nature of thinking around the application of insolvency law in South Africa.  Cognizance 
should now be taken of the interests of the debtors.  Further evidence of the shift in the 
thinking can be found in the recent promulgation of business rescue procedures in the new 
Companies Act,
44
 that aim to assist financially distressed juristic persons.   
 
From the above it is clear that in matters requiring the application of the National Credit Act 
and the Insolvency Act, cognizance must now be taken of both the interests of the 
consumer/debtor and credit provider/creditor.  A failure to do so would be contrary to the 
stated purposes of the National Credit Act, court decisions requiring a balancing of the 
interests of the different parties and international and national developments in the field of 
insolvency law.  Thus, any proposals made in this dissertation would also have to analyse the 
effect such a proposal would have on all the parties involved. 
  
                                                          
44
 71 of 2008. 
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3. Application of the acts 
3.1 Application of the Insolvency Act 
 
The next logical step would be to analyse to whom the different acts apply in order to 
determine the overlap of application of the National Credit Act and the Insolvency Act.  We 
will start with the analysis of the application of the Insolvency Act.  The Insolvency Act 
discusses to whom it applies by stating who can be a debtor for the purposes of the act and 
who can be sequestrated.  The term “debtor” is defined in section 2 of the Insolvency Act as: 
 
“in connection with the sequestration of the debtor’s estate, means a person or a partnership or the 
estate of a person or partnership which is a debtor in the usual sense of the word, except a body 
corporate or a company or other association of persons which may be placed in liquidation under 
the law relating to companies…” 
 
The first question that arises from the above definition is what does the term “a debtor in the 
usual sense of the word” refer to.  What is a debtor?  The above quotation purports to define 
the term “debtor” and yet still does not do that, it merely states which persons or entities can 
be a debtor for the purposes of the act.  It has been left to the courts to define the specific 
aspects of a person or entity that will render them a “debtor”.  In the case Magnum Financial 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Summerly and another
45
 it was held that an entity or 
association of persons is regarded as “a debtor in the usual sense of the word” if it is able to 
possess an estate and incur debts.
46
 
 
From the definition it is clear that the act applies to both natural persons and partnerships, or 
the estates of those persons or partnerships.  While not specifically stated in the definition of 
“debtor” above, it can be inferred from a reading of section 3(1) of the Insolvency Act that 
the act also applies to insolvent deceased estates and estates under curatorship.
47
  The courts 
have extended the definition of  “debtor” to include entities or associations of persons that are 
not a juristic person, such as a trust or a club.
48
  The entities that the act does not apply to 
because they do not fall within the definition of “debtors” provided by the Insolvency Act are 
                                                          
45
 1984 1 SA 160 (W). 
46
 At 163. 
47
 Sharrock et al (n 4) 6. 
48
 Magnum Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Summerly and another 1984 1 SA 160 (W) 163. 
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companies and external companies that may be wound up in terms of the Companies Act
49
 or 
close corporations that are wound up in terms of the Close Corporations Act.
50
 
 
Thus, it can be summarised, and be said that the term “debtor” includes the following: 
 Natural persons. 
 Partnerships. 
 Deceased estates and estates under curatorship. 
 Entities or associations of persons that are not a juristic person, such as a trust or a 
club.
51
 
The group listed above are the parties that make up the group of so called “debtors” and as 
such these parties are also the only parties that may be sequestrated in terms of the Insolvency 
Act. 
 
3.2 Application of the National Credit Act 
 
A juristic person is given an extended definition in the National Credit Act and includes 
partnerships, companies, associations of persons (incorporated or unincorporated) and certain 
trusts.52  This is a very strange definition as partnerships do not usually get classified as 
juristic persons because they lack certain characteristics usually considered essential to 
juristic personality, such as perpetual succession and separate legal personality, to name but 
two. 
 
The general rule relating to the application of the National Credit Act can be found in section 
4 of the Act.  Section 4(1) of the Act states that - 
 
“Subject to sections 5 and 6, this Act applies to every credit agreement between parties dealing at 
arm’s length and made within, or having an effect within, the Republic, except –  
(a) A credit agreement in terms of which the consumer is –  
(i) a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover, together with the combined asset 
value or annual turnover of all related juristic persons, at the time the agreement is 
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made, equals or exceeds the threshold value determined by the Minister in terms of 
section 7(1); 
(ii) the state; or 
(iii) an organ of state; 
(b) a large agreement, as described in section 9(4), in terms of which the consumer is a juristic 
person whose asset value or annual turnover is, at the time the agreement is made, below the 
threshold value determined by the Minister in terms of section 7(1); 
(c) a credit agreement in terms of which the credit provider is the Reserve Bank of South Africa; 
or 
(d) a credit agreement in respect of which the credit provider is located outside the Republic, 
approved by the Minister on application by the consumer in the prescribed manner and form. 
 
The general rule is that the National Credit Act applies to all credit agreements concluded 
between parties who are independent of each other and which are concluded within or which 
have an effect within South Africa.
53
  However, as with all things, there are certain 
exceptions to the abovementioned general rule.  The first such exception states that where the 
consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover, together with the asset 
value or annual turnover of all related juristic persons exceeds a threshold value, to be 
determined by the Minister, the National Credit Act will not apply to the credit agreement 
concluded between the parties.
54
  The Minister has since declared that the threshold value 
will be R1 million.
55
  Thus, the first exception to the general rule basically states that the 
National Credit Act applies only to juristic persons who can be classified as “small”56 juristic 
persons.  The second exception to the general rule states that the National Credit Act will not 
apply where the consumer is a small juristic person who has concluded a large credit 
agreement.
57
  A large credit agreement is either a mortgage agreement (regardless of the 
quantum involved) or a credit transaction (other than a pawn transaction or credit guarantee) 
where the principal debt exceeds an amount to be determined by the Minister.
58
  The Minister 
has determined that the threshold amount should be R250 000.
59
  To summarise the position 
with respect to consumers who are juristic persons, it can be said that the National Credit Act 
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only applies to small juristic persons who have not concluded a large credit agreement.  The 
National Credit Act will always apply where the consumer is a natural person. 
 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, we cannot stop there.  This dissertation will 
discuss aspects relating to over-indebtedness, reckless credit and debt review.  These aspects 
are dealt with in Part D of Chapter 4 of the National Credit Act.  Section 6 of the National 
Credit Act deals with the limited application of certain sections of the act when the consumer 
is a juristic person and states that the provisions of Part D of Chapter 4 do not apply to credit 
agreements where the consumer is a juristic person.
60
  To ensure that the provisions of those 
sections are not applied when the consumer is a juristic person, the legislature added a further 
provision stating the exact same thing as the aforementioned section 6(1).  Section 78(1) is 
that other provision and it also states that the provisions of Part D of Chapter 4 do not apply 
where the consumer is a juristic person.  To summarise, a juristic person who is the consumer 
in a credit agreement cannot apply to be declared over-indebted nor can it apply for debt 
review, nor can it rely on reckless credit having granted to it.  Small juristic persons who 
have concluded small credit agreements will however be afforded some protection from the 
other sections of the Act.  Natural persons who are the consumer in a credit agreement will be 
afforded the full protection of the National Credit Act. 
 
From the exhaustive discussion of the application of the various acts, we can now collate the 
findings and see to which parties the two acts can apply simultaneously.  Firstly, both acts 
apply fully to natural persons.  With respect to partnerships, trusts and other entities without 
juristic personality, the National Credit Act only applies to a limited extent.  The protection 
offered by the National Credit Act in respect of over-indebtedness and reckless credit does 
not apply to any juristic persons at all; it only applies where the consumer is a natural person.  
Thus the focus of this dissertation will be on the application of the National Credit Act and 
the Insolvency Act on natural persons. 
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4. Discussion of the relevant provisions in the National Credit Act and 
the Insolvency Act 
4.1 Voluntary surrender and its requirements 
 
Voluntary surrender basically entails a situation where the debtor or his duly authorised agent 
applies to have the debtor’s previously issued notice of surrender accepted by the court.  The 
court may only grant an application for voluntary surrender if it is satisfied that: 
1. the debtor’s estate is in fact, insolvent; and 
2. the debtor owns realizable property of sufficient value to defray all costs of the 
sequestration which will in terms of this act be payable out of the free residue of his 
estate; and 
3. that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor; and 
4. that the preliminary formalities have been complied with.61 
 
The requirement for voluntary surrender that sequestration will be to the advantage of 
creditors is more onerous than the requirement that there is reason to believe that 
sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors that is required in compulsory 
sequestration.  There are various reasons which could explain the existence of this increased 
onus.  The first such reason could be to prevent an abuse of process.  Such an abuse of 
process is an ever-present risk due to the fact that one of the consequences of a sequestration 
process is to relieve the debts of the debtor and thus it is very likely that debtors will apply 
for voluntary surrender in order to relieve their debts even in situations where there is little if 
any pecuniary benefit for creditors.
62
  What must be remembered is that the Insolvency Act 
was passed for the benefit of creditors, not to relieve the debts of insolvent debtors, even 
though debt relief is a consequence of a sequestration order.  A second possible reason could 
be due to the fact that the debtor is expected to have more information regarding his own 
financial position that any petitioning creditor/s would have when applying for compulsory 
sequestration.
63
  Thus it can be expected of the debtor to provide more detail in his 
application for voluntary surrender. 
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4.2 Compulsory sequestration and its requirements 
 
In contrast to voluntary surrender where the application is made by the debtor himself or his 
duly authorised agent, an application for compulsory sequestration will be brought by one or 
more of the debtor’s creditors.64  The court will only grant the creditor’s application if the 
court is satisfied that the following requirements have been met: 
 
1. The creditor has established a claim which entitles him, in terms of section 9(1), to 
apply for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate;65 and 
2. the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and 
3. there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor if 
his estate is sequestrated.
66
 
 
Compulsory sequestration proceedings may be instituted by a single creditor (or his agent), 
only if the creditor has a liquidated claim against the consumer of not less than R100.  
Compulsory sequestration proceedings may also be instituted by two or more creditors jointly 
(or their agents) whose liquidated claims in aggregate are not less than R200.
67
 
 
The onus of proof rests entirely on the shoulders of the creditor bringing the application. 
There is no onus of proof on the debtor to disprove any of the abovementioned 
requirements.
68
  Creditors will not usually be in a position to allege and prove that the 
debtor’s liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets, fairly valued.69  The creditor will 
simply not be privy to most of that information and thus it would be very difficult for 
creditors to prove the debtor is insolvent.
70
  Thus, the legislature created certain “acts of 
insolvency” which, if committed, would allow the creditor to apply for the sequestration of 
the debtor without having to prove the debtor is actually insolvent.
71
  In terms of the 
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Insolvency Act, there are a limited number of acts of insolvency.
72
  The list of the acts of 
insolvency constitutes a numerus clausus which cannot be extended by the court.
73
 
 
The third requirement is that the petitioner must show that there is reason to believe that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of the creditors.  The word “creditors” as it is used 
here, refers to all the creditors or at least the general body of creditors.
74
  Thus, it implies that 
the court will only grant an application for sequestration if the creditor can show that the 
sequestration will be to the advantage of the general body of creditors and that the 
sequestration will not merely be to the advantage of some of the creditors or the creditors 
who have a majority in value.  The term “advantage of the creditor” has been interpreted by 
the courts to mean that for sequestration to be to the advantage of the general body of 
creditors, it must “yield, at the least, a not negligible dividend.”75  The courts have also held 
that in order to satisfy the “advantage of the creditors” requirement, the petitioner should 
show that the sequestration will or there is reason to believe (depending on whether it is an 
application for voluntary surrender brought by the debtor or an application for compulsory 
sequestration brought by a creditor) that the dividend that will be received from the 
sequestration process will be greater than what would otherwise be obtainable.
76
  Thus, it 
would be required of the petitioner to show that the dividend that is likely under sequestration 
is greater than under other remedies available to the creditors, for instance a sale in 
execution.
77
  The courts have also held that the quantum of proof required of the creditor is to 
satisfy the court that there is a reasonable prospect – not necessarily a likelihood but a 
prospect – which is not too remote.78 
4.3 Test for insolvency versus the test for over-indebtedness 
 
The term “insolvency” is not defined in the Insolvency Act but the courts have held that the 
test for insolvency is whether the debtor’s liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets, fairly 
valued.
79
  This test has come to be known as “actual insolvency.”80  This should be 
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distinguished from the concept of “commercial insolvency”, which refers to a situation where 
the debtor is unable to pay his debts as they fall due and payable.
81
  Thus a debtor applying 
for voluntary surrender or a creditor applying for compulsory sequestration where no act of 
insolvency has been committed will have to prove that the debtor is “actually insolvent.”  In 
applications for voluntary surrender, it can be expected of the debtor to show “actual 
insolvency” because the debtor will be privy to all the information necessary to allege and 
prove this fact.  If the debtor is unable to show that his liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his 
assets, fairly valued, the court will most likely not grant the application for voluntary 
surrender.
82
  However, in applications for compulsory sequestration by a creditor/s, the 
petitioning creditor will usually not be privy to this information and thus it is unlikely that the 
creditor will be able to apply for the sequestration of the debtor on the ground that the debtor 
is actually insolvent.  The courts have held that proof of an inability to pay debts merely 
constitutes a prima facie case which shifts the onus of proof to the debtor to show that he is 
not actually insolvent.
83
  It has also been held that at the provisional order stage, if the 
petitioning creditor makes out a prima facie case, a provisional winding up order should 
normally be granted.
84
  Combining these two principles we can conclude that the courts will 
be prepared to grant a provisional sequestration order if the petitioning creditor can prove that 
the debtor is unable to pay his debts.   
 
Otto summarises the test for over-indebtedness, found in the National Credit Act succinctly 
by stating that: 
 
“A consumer is over-indebted when he is unable to satisfy all his obligations under all his 
credit agreements in a timely manner, having regard to his financial means, prospects, 
obligations and history of debt repayment.”85 
 
Thus the main requirement in order for a consumer to be declared over-indebted is that 
the consumer is unable to satisfy his obligations under all his credit agreements in a 
timely manner having regard to his financial means, prospects, obligations and history 
of debt repayment.  The latter part of the test for over-indebtedness that refers to the 
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consumer’s “financial means, prospects, obligations and history of debt repayment” is 
very important to keep in mind as it is often neglected as part of the test for insolvency. 
5. Courts’ capacity to mero motu consider the issues of over-indebtedness 
and reckless credit 
5.1 Introduction 
As has been stated above, it will more than likely be the case that the party whose estate is to 
be sequestrated will contain at least one, if not more than one, credit agreement.  Thus, the 
judge considering the sequestration application will be compelled to consider the provisions 
of both the Insolvency Act, as well as the National Credit Act.  One of the rather peculiar 
provisions of the National Credit Act relates to the courts’ potential capacity to mero motu 
consider the issues of over-indebtedness and reckless credit in any court proceedings where a 
credit agreement is being considered.  Thus, the capacity of a court, while considering a 
sequestration application, to mero motu consider the issues of over-indebtedness and reckless 
credit will now be investigated.   
5.2 Requirements for the investigation of over-indebtedness and 
reckless credit 
To begin with, an analysis of the position of the court with respect to over-indebtedness is 
needed.  To do this, we must firstly ask what the National Credit Act says about the court’s 
capacity to mero motu consider whether a party before the court is over-indebted.  Section 85 
of the National Credit Act provides that- 
 
“Despite any provision of law or agreement to the contrary, in any court proceedings in 
which a credit agreement is being considered, if it is alleged that the consumer under a 
credit agreement is over-indebted, the court may…” refer the matter to a debt counsellor 
or declare the consumer over-indebted.  
 
 
From this section, it is clear that there are two requirements that must be met before the court 
may investigate whether or not the consumer is over-indebted.  The first requirement is that a 
23 
 
credit agreement is being considered before the court and the second requirement is that an 
allegation of over-indebtedness must have been raised by any one of the parties before the 
court.   
 
With respect to the first requirement, some might argue whether or not the statement “in any 
court proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered...”86 actually includes 
sequestration proceedings within its ambit.  As this dissertation is investigating the impact of 
the National Credit Act on insolvency proceedings, we will limit the investigation to whether 
or not the abovementioned first requirement includes sequestration proceedings within its 
ambit.  Phrasing the abovementioned question in another manner, the question to be 
answered is whether or not credit agreements are considered in sequestration proceedings.  
Insolvency proceedings basically set out to determine whether or not the debtor’s estate is 
insolvent.  A debtor’s estate consists of both assets and liabilities.87  The liabilities forming 
part of a debtor’s estate will often consist of credit agreements regulated by the National 
Credit Act.  Thus, as the liabilities of the debtor’s estate are under investigation, so too will 
the credit agreements to which the debtor is a party be investigated.  Even if we simply look 
at the actual test for insolvency which states that a person is insolvent when the debtor’s 
liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets, fairly valued,
88
 we again find that the liabilities 
of the consumer, which are to a large extent made up of credit agreements, are at the forefront 
of the courts’ investigation in insolvency proceedings.  Thus, it can be surmised that the first 
requirement is met in the vast majority of insolvency proceedings.   
 
The second requirement calls for an allegation of over-indebtedness by one of the parties 
before the court.  Clearly this does not give the court an unfettered discretion to investigate 
whether the consumer is over-indebted in each case.
89
  The only time a court may investigate 
a claim of over-indebtedness is when the issue of over-indebtedness is raised in court 
proceedings where a credit agreement is being considered.  While the section does not say 
which party is permitted to make the allegation, there must be some sort of overt allegation 
by either of the parties, to the effect that the consumer is over-indebted.  Only then will the 
court be allowed to consider whether or not the consumer is over-indebted.  Thus it can be 
surmised that while the court is considering a sequestration application, unless there is some 
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overt allegation of over-indebtedness by one of the parties before the court, the court may not 
mero motu consider the issue of over-indebtedness itself.
90
  Further, considering the wording 
of the National Credit Act, the court will also not be allowed to declare a consumer over-
indebted and refer that debtor for debt review without an allegation that the debtor is over-
indebted.
91
 
 
In terms of the National Credit Act there is only one requirement that must be met before the 
court can determine whether or not the credit agreement amounts to reckless credit, the 
requirement being that a credit agreement must be considered by the court.
92
  This first 
requirement was dealt with above and it was concluded that it is met in the vast majority of 
insolvency proceedings.  There is no mention of any further requirements as is the case in the 
section dealing with over-indebtedness.  Thus a court considering a sequestration application 
may mero motu decide whether or not any credit agreement amounts to reckless credit.
93
   
 
The result of the abovementioned provisions is that the court, considering a sequestration 
application, will not have the capacity to refer the debtor to a debt counsellor for debt review 
or declare the debtor over-indebted itself; however the court will have the capacity to declare 
that any credit agreement to which the debtor is a party amounts to reckless credit.  The 
question that immediately springs to mind is whether or not this differential treatment can be 
justified on legal grounds.  To determine this we must investigate the practical implications 
of the differential treatment and any suggested alternative solutions to see if the problem can 
be solved in another manner.  We must then apply the rules, principles and theories of 
statutory interpretation to ascertain whether or not the differential treatment can be justified 
and if it cannot be justified, whether or not an amendment to section 85 is necessary.   
5.3 Practical implications 
If a debtor applies to court for an order to place himself in voluntary surrender, the court will 
have the capacity to declare any credit agreement to which the debtor is a party as an instance 
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of reckless credit .
94
  Normally, the court considering an application for voluntary surrender 
will be presented with a list of the creditors, their addresses and the particulars of each claim 
and any security held for the debt in the debtor’s notice of motion and founding affidavits.95  
This information contained in the notice of motion and founding affidavit will not be 
sufficient in most cases to determine if the debtor is a party to a reckless credit agreement.  
To substantiate this statement, let us analyse the types of reckless credit that may be granted: 
 
“A credit agreement is reckless if, at the time that the agreement was made, or at the time 
when the amount approved in terms of the agreement is increased, other than an increase 
in terms of section 119(4)- 
(a) the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by s81(2), irrespective 
of what the outcome of such an assessment might have concluded at the time; or 
(b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by s81(2), entered 
into the credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the preponderance of 
information available to the credit provider indicated that- 
(i) the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the consumer’s risks, costs 
or obligations under the proposed credit agreement; or 
(ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer over-indebted.”96 
 
The court merely considering the voluntary surrender application and having only the notice 
of motion and founding affidavit before it will find it almost impossible to make a finding 
that a certain specific credit agreement amounts to reckless credit because no credit 
assessment was performed by the credit provider.  The consumer will not know if a credit 
assessment was done or not because there is no way that a credit provider would inform a 
consumer that no credit assessment was performed prior to the conclusion of the credit 
agreement.  A credit provider would never divulge the fact that no credit assessment was 
performed as this would be inviting harm and the possibility that all or part of the obligations 
under the credit agreement be set aside.
97
  The same applies to the next form of reckless 
credit.  How could the court glean from the information before it that, based on all the 
information available to the credit provider, the consumer did not understand or appreciate 
the risks, costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement?  The consumer, and by 
implication the court, would not know what information the credit provider had before it and 
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thus it would be impossible for the court to declare that based on the information before the 
credit provider, the consumer did not understand or appreciate the risks, costs or obligations 
under the proposed credit agreement.  This same argument applies to the third type of 
reckless credit agreement as well.  It may be argued that it would be obvious in some cases 
where the obligations in terms of the credit agreement far outweigh the means of the 
consumer, but even so the court would not know what information the credit provider had 
before it.  The consumer may have misled the credit provider as to his financial means and 
this would consequently amount to a complete defence for the credit provider against reckless 
credit allegations.
98
   
 
It is possible that a credit provider could oppose the application for voluntary surrender.  
Creditors are entitled to oppose the application for voluntary surrender,
99
 provided they have 
complied with certain formalities.
100
  The opposing creditor/s to the voluntary surrender 
application may allege, in its/their answering affidavits, that the consumer is over-indebted.  
This overt allegation would be sufficient for a court to refer the debtor to a debt counsellor 
for debt review
101
 or for the court to declare the debtor over-indebted.
102
  While this is a 
possibility, this dissertation will focus on the situations of unopposed applications for 
voluntary surrender and opposed applications where there is no allegation of over-
indebtedness by one of the opposing creditors.  Thus, this dissertation will focus mainly on 
the situations where the court is precluded from referring a debtor for debt review or making 
a finding of over-indebtedness. 
 
To surmise, while it is conceivable that a court may mero motu find that reckless credit was 
granted, it is unlikely that the court would be able to come to that conclusion in voluntary 
surrender applications.  Also, the court hearing a voluntary surrender application would be 
precluded from referring a debtor to debt review or declaring the debtor over-indebted unless 
a creditor opposes the application on the basis that the debtor is over-indebted.  Apart from 
that lone situation, the provisions of the National Credit Act with respect to over-
indebtedness, reckless credit and debt review find little application in voluntary surrender 
applications. 
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Next we must examine the situation where a creditor applies for the sequestration of a debtor.  
A creditor must bring an application for the sequestration of a debtor by way of a notice of 
motion and founding affidavit.  The founding affidavit must set out the facts and 
circumstances necessary to satisfy the legislative requirements for compulsory 
sequestration,
103
 those requirements are: 
1. The petitioning creditor has established against the debtor a claim such as is 
mentioned in subsection (1) of section 9; and 
2. the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and 
3. there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor if 
his estate is sequestrated.
104
 
 
The petitioning creditor is required to bring two applications for the compulsory sequestration 
of the debtor’s estate.  The first provisional sequestration application is governed by section 
10 of the Insolvency Act and merely requires the petitioning creditor to satisfy the above 
mentioned requirements on a prima facie basis.  Even though the petitioning creditor may 
satisfy the requirements on a prima facie basis, the court is still given a discretion whether or 
not to grant the provisional sequestration application.
105
  If the court grants a provisional 
sequestration order and thereby provisionally sequestrates the estate of the debtor, it must 
simultaneously grant a rule nisi calling upon the debtor to appear before the court on the day 
mentioned in the rule to show cause why his or her estate should not be sequestrated 
finally.
106
  If, at the hearing pursuant to the aforementioned rule nisi, the court is satisfied on a 
balance of probabilities,
107
 that the aforementioned requirements have been met, the court 
may grant the final sequestration order.
108
  Again, as is the case for a voluntary surrender 
application, the court has an overriding discretion whether or not to grant the final 
sequestration order even if all the requirements have been met.
109
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In order to satisfy the abovementioned requirements, the founding affidavit will normally 
have to contain the following information: 
1. Full particulars describing the sequestrating creditor and debtor.110 
2. The nature of the petitioning creditor’s claim and averments to satisfy the court that 
the petitioning creditor’s claim complies with the provisions of section 9(1) of the 
Insolvency Act.
111
 
3. An averment regarding the act of insolvency committed by the debtor or an averment 
showing the debtor is in fact insolvent.
112
 
4. An averment to show that there is reason to believe that sequestration will be to the 
advantage of the creditors.
113
 
5. Any other relevant fact.114 
 
From the information required in the founding affidavit, we can see that the only credit 
agreement which can be scrutinized by the court is the credit agreement which was concluded 
between the petitioning creditor and the debtor.  If any of the debtor’s other creditors want to 
share in the proceeds of the insolvent estate, those creditors must prove a claim against the 
insolvent estate at a meeting of the creditors.
115
  The meetings of the creditors will only 
happen after the court grants a final sequestration order.  Thus the court granting the 
sequestration application will never be privy to the other credit agreements to which the 
debtor was a party and thus it would be impossible for the court to declare any of those other 
credit agreements to be an instance of reckless credit.  The credit agreement forming part of 
the petitioning creditor’s averments is the only credit agreement which can be declared 
constituting reckless credit.  As is the case with voluntary surrender, the court will also not be 
allowed to refer the debtor for debt review or to declare the debtor over-indebted without 
such an allegation by the opposing debtor.   
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5.4 Alternative solutions 
Boraine and Calitz suggest a rather eloquent solution to the problem pointed out above by 
suggesting that the responsibility of detecting and refusing the claims of a creditor who has 
concluded unlawful or reckless credit agreements, should fall upon the trustee at the various 
meetings of the creditors.
116
  They propose that it is the duty of the trustee to investigate 
whether or not any claim alleged by a creditor, is a legitimate claim in law.  In considering 
whether or not a claim is legitimate in law, the provisions of the National Credit Act with 
respect to unlawful credit agreements and reckless credit agreements must be considered.  If 
the trustee  finds that the agreement is an unlawful credit agreement or reckless credit 
agreement, the trustee should refuse the claim.  Where a creditor’s claim has been refused, 
the creditor will then have to approach a court of law to prove that the claim is in fact good in 
law.
117
 
 
Boraine and Calitz’s solution removes all the responsibility of identifying reckless credit 
agreements from the court deciding insolvency applications and places the responsibility 
squarely on the shoulders of the trustee.  While this approach does have the merit of the time 
and costs saved before the court in insolvency proceedings, it also has certain disadvantages 
such as the fact that the trustee is now burdened with identifying reckless credit agreements.  
This does not sound like much of a disadvantage when one considers that it is one of their 
duties to make sure all claims proved against the insolvent estate are good in law.
118
  
However, it is a disadvantage because trustees will not have any experience in identifying 
reckless credit agreements and it is not a requirement for them to undergo any sort of a 
training course to identify such agreements.  Without such training or experience it would be 
difficult for trustees to identify instances of reckless credit provision.  This should be 
contrasted with the registration requirement of debt counsellors.  There are registration 
requirements listed in both the National Credit Act and the Regulations thereto.  Of interest is 
regulation 10 which requires that any natural person applying to be registered as a debt 
counsellor must have completed a debt counselling course approved by the National Credit 
Regulator and provided by an institution approved by the National Credit Regulator.
119
  This 
training course will assist the prospective debt counsellor in identifying instances of reckless 
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credit provision.  However, the only manner that a debtor in insolvency proceedings could 
come before a debt counsellor is if the court refers that debtor to them.  As we saw above, 
this would not be possible without an overt allegation of over-indebtedness by one of the 
parties before the court. 
 
Another issue which Boraine and Calitz raise relates to the fact that the court would have 
considered all the possible alternatives before ordering that the debtor be sequestrated.
120
  
This is in accordance with the requirement for sequestration that sequestration will be to the 
advantage of creditors (in the case of voluntary surrender) and that there is reason to believe 
that it will be to the advantage of creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated (in the 
case of compulsory sequestration).  Both of these requirements basically require the same 
thing; the only thing that differs is the quantum of proof required in each case.  What both of 
these requirements require the petitioner to show is that sequestration will be better than the 
other available procedures available to the creditors.  In other words that the dividend that 
will be received from the sequestration will be greater than what would otherwise be 
obtainable through any other procedure.
121
  Boraine and Calitz include debt counselling as an 
alternative procedure that must be considered by the court when considering the alternatives 
to sequestration.
122
  However, as a point of departure the courts are responsible for applying 
the law as it stands in legislation.  Only once that legislation is held to be invalid by the courts 
are the courts no longer bound to apply it as it stands.  Thus, as it currently stands, the courts 
must apply the National Credit Act as it stands until a superior court decides it is invalid.  To 
this day, no court has held section 85 to be invalid and thus it must be applied by the courts as 
it stands.  As it stands now, the only time a court may investigate whether or not a consumer 
is over-indebted is after one of the parties makes such an allegation.
123
  Thus, it cannot be 
said that the investigation into over-indebtedness and referral for debt review is a procedure 
available to the court for consideration in sequestration proceedings.  Only with an 
amendment to section 85 could declaring a debtor over-indebted and referring them for debt 
review be considered a possible alternative procedure available to the courts in sequestration 
proceedings. 
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5.5 Statutory interpretation  
Next we must use statutory interpretation to determine what the purposes of the National 
Credit Act are with respect to over-indebtedness, reckless credit and the debt review process 
in order to see whether or not these purposes are being achieved and if these purposes are not 
being achieved, whether a statutory amendment is necessary in order to achieve those 
purposes.  There are many theoretical approaches to statutory interpretation (and subdivisions 
thereof). However, the two main theories which have been applied in South Africa are the 
literal (text-based) approach and the purposive (text-in-context) approach.
124
 
 
According to the literal approach, the interpreter should primarily concentrate on the actual 
wording and literal meaning of the provision.  This approach basically says that if the 
meaning of the provision is clear, it should be put into effect and that such a clear meaning 
should be equated to be the legislature’s true intention.125  However, if the so called literal 
meaning of the words is ambiguous, vague or misleading, or if a strict interpretation would 
result in absurd results, the court may deviate from the literal meaning to avoid such an 
absurdity.
126
  The court may then make use of the “secondary aids”127 and the “tertiary 
aids”128 to determine the intention of the legislature.129   
 
The literal approach to statutory interpretation was originally an English-law phenomenon 
that was introduced into the South African legal system during the English colonization of the 
Cape in the 18
th
 century.  The literal approach was introduced into South African law via the 
decision of the court in De Villiers v Cape Divisional Council
130
 where it was held that 
legislation promulgated after the British occupation of the Cape should be interpreted in 
accordance with the English rules of statutory interpretation.
131
  This method of statutory 
interpretation is quite distinct from the Roman-Dutch law method of statutory interpretation 
which is premised on the principle that the purpose of the legislation should prevail.
132
   
 
                                                          
124
 Botha Statutory Interpretation: An introduction for students (2012) 91. 
125
 Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26 30. 
126
 Venter v R 1907 TS 910 914. 
127
 Some of the “secondary aids” include the long title of the Act, headings to chapters and sections and the text 
of the Act in another official language. 
128
 The “tertiary aids” consist mainly of the common-law presumptions with respect to statutory interpretation. 
129
 Botha (n 124) 91. 
130
 1875 Buch 50. 
131
 Botha (n 124) 92. 
132
 Botha (n 124) 92. 
32 
 
The second main theory of statutory interpretation is the so called “purposive approach”.  
This theory proceeds from the premise that the legislative function is a purpose oriented 
activity.
133
  Legislation aims to fill certain lacunae in the legal system of a particular society.  
Thus, at the outset of the legislative function, the legislature has a perceived purpose in mind 
with the drafting of the particular piece of legislation.  In the oft quoted minority decision of 
Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges,
134
 he gives his support to the purposive approach, by stating 
that: 
 
“Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and 
expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is 
the statement that they must be interpreted in the light of their context.  But it may be 
useful to stress two points in relation to the application of this principle.  The first is that 
‘the context’, as here used, is not limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded 
as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted.  Often of more 
importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, 
its background.”135 
 
In the abovementioned decision, Schreiner JA clearly advocates the use of the purposive 
approach when interpreting statutes.  As we can see from the quote, Schreiner JA states that 
the ordinary meaning of the text carries just as much weight as the contextual meaning 
thereof when the meaning of legislation is being considered.  According to Botha’s 
interpretation of the statements of Schreiner JA, the purposive approach considers both the 
grammatical meaning and other indicators to determine the contextual meaning to determine 
the purpose of the legislation.
136
  Thus, it can be said that the purposive approach attempts to 
discover the purpose of the legislation under consideration, by taking into account various 
factors.  Botha summarises the guidelines one should consider when applying the purposive 
approach as follows: 
 
 Right from the outset, the interpreter may take the wider context of the provision (for 
instance its ambit and purpose) into consideration with the legislative text in 
question. 
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 Irrespective of how clear or unambiguous the grammatical meaning of the legislative 
text may seem to be, the relevant contextual factors (for instance the practical effects 
of different interpretations, as well as the background of the provision) must be taken 
into account. 
 Sometimes this wider context may even be more important than the legislative text. 
 Once the meaning of the text and context (language-in-context) is determined, it 
must be applied, irrespective of whether the interpreter is of the opinion that the 
legislature intended something else.
137
 
 
The above guidelines are a basic model of the guidelines to be considered if the court wanted 
to conduct a purposive inquiry prior to the new constitutional dispensation.  The Jaga v 
Dönges
138
 decision was one of the first attempts made by our courts to depart from the 
previous literal approach-driven dispensation, to a dispensation that utilises both the 
grammatical meaning of the text as well as the wider contextual factors.  After the Jaga 
decision only a few courts were prepared to apply the “new” purposive approach, and thus 
the process of change to a purposive approach to statutory interpretation proved to be rather 
slow and as Botha puts it “... with progress alternating with regression”.139  Up until the start 
of South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation, debate raged among academics and the 
courts as to the appropriate form of statutory interpretation to be used.  This dissertation will 
not discuss the merits and demerits of the abovementioned theories, it will instead state which 
theory was eventually accepted by the constitutional court.  The Constitution of the Republic 
South Africa
140
 brought about many changes to the law in general and specifically with 
reference to the manner in which legislation had to be interpreted.  The Constitution has its 
own interpretation section in which it explains the manner in which legislation must be 
interpreted. Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that- 
 
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights.” 
 
This provision clearly envisages an approach that goes beyond the mere literal meaning of the 
text.  The provision contemplates the promotion of the “spirit, purports and objects of the Bill 
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of Rights” whenever one is called upon to interpret legislation.  However, apart from the 
above conclusion that can be drawn, the Constitution does not undisputedly give its support 
to either of the abovementioned theories of statutory interpretation.  Thus, the constitutional 
court was called upon to settle the issue.  In the constitutional court’s first case, S v Zuma,141 
the court decided to apply a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
142
  While the 
justices may have disagreed as to exact content of the purposive approach, it was clear that 
the purposive approach was the approach followed by the court in that case.
143
  The approach 
adopted by the court cannot be classified as the “pure” purposive approach because the 
original purposive approach, as discussed above, did not have as one of its factors the 
consideration of constitutional values.  Thus, the Constitution together with the constitutional 
court in the Zuma decision effectively adopted a “new” approach to statutory interpretation.  
This new approach can be termed the constitutional purposive approach.  This constitutional 
purposive approach was confirmed as the approach to be used in statutory interpretation by 
the President of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane.
144
  Thus, it is clear that the 
constitutional purposive approach is the correct approach to apply to statutory interpretation.  
The only further conjecture would be regarding the content of the constitutional purposive 
approach.  In the case of Minister of Land Affairs of the Republic of South Africa v 
Slamdien
145
 the court set out the post-constitutional principles that must be followed when 
one has to interpret a statute in accordance with the constitutional purposive approach.  These 
principles or guidelines were a concise statement of the various principles the court 
highlighted as important on previous occasions where statutory interpretation was required:
146
 
 
(i) Have regard to the context of the provision in the sense of its historical origins; 
(ii) have regard to its context in the sense of the statute as a whole, the subject matter 
and broad objects of the statute and the values which underlie it; 
(iii) have regard to its immediate context in the sense of the particular part of the 
statute in which the provision appears or those provisions with which it is 
interrelated; 
(iv) have regard to the precise wording of the provision; and 
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(v) where a constitutional right is concerned ... adopt a generous rather than a 
legalistic perspective aimed at securing for individuals the full benefit of the 
protection which the right confers.
147
 
 
This dissertation will make use of the factors articulated in the Slamdien decision in order to 
carry out the interpretation of the position with respect to over-indebtedness, reckless credit 
and debt review.  The fourth guideline which states that regard must be given to the precise 
wording of the provision, has been dealt with above where it was stated that the court may 
mero motu decide whether or not any credit agreement before it amounts to reckless credit
148
 
and that the court may not mero motu declare any debtor over-indebted or refer a person for 
debt review without a party before the court making an allegation that the debtor is over-
indebted. 
 
Firstly, let us deal with the historical origins which gave rise to the need for the promulgation 
of the National Credit Act and more specifically the need for provisions dealing with over-
indebtedness and reckless credit.  Both the concepts of over-indebtedness and reckless credit 
were unknown to South African law prior to their inclusion in the National Credit Act.  Prior 
to the promulgation of the National Credit Act, credit law in South Africa was regulated by 
the Usury Act
149
 and the Credit Agreements Act.
150
  As Otto states “The Usury Act and the 
Credit Agreements Act were supposed to co-exist and supplement each other, but this in fact 
caused an extremely difficult situation in the field of consumer credit law.”151  These 
“difficulties” led to many different committees being established and compiling reports on 
the regulation of the consumer credit industry in South Africa.
152
  The report I would like to 
focus on is the report published in 2004 by the Department of Trade and Industry which 
highlighted the main weaknesses in consumer credit regulation.
153
  The criticism was directed 
at the following problem areas: 
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 fragmented and outdated legislation; 
 ineffective consumer protection, particularly in relation to the 85 per cent of the population in 
low-income groups; 
 the high cost of credit and, for some areas, the lack of access to credit; 
 rising levels of over-indebtedness; and 
 reckless behaviour by credit providers and exploitation of consumers by micro-lenders, 
intermediaries, debt collectors, and debt administrators.
154
 
 
From the above it becomes clear that the period leading up to the promulgation of the 
National Credit Act was characterised by situations where the reckless behaviour of credit 
providers were causing consumers to become over-indebted.  The sector of the population 
which was especially being taken advantage of by credit providers was the low-income sector 
of society.  The low-income sector of society does not stand on an equal footing with credit 
providers with respect to their bargaining power and, without protection from the legislature, 
will always be the subject of abuse by unscrupulous credit providers.  The previous 
dispensation did not have many provisions to protect consumers and did not give regulatory 
bodies much power to punish such unscrupulous credit providers.  Thus, a need arose for a 
new piece of legislation which would regulate credit law in South Africa as amendments to 
the existing acts would not prove sufficient as the purposes and objects of the acts did not 
accord with the needs of society.  A new act was needed which would aim to protect 
consumers both from themselves and from the reckless lending practises that characterised 
the time.  While these were the problem areas identified by the commission, the Department 
of Trade and Industry concurrently set up a Technical Committee to undertake a credit law 
review to examine these problems areas and make proposals.
155
  One of the main proposals 
proposed by the committee was that the focus should be shifted from price control to 
protection against over-indebtedness, and to the regulation of undesirable lending 
practices.
156
  This was quite a radical conclusion that was reached by the committee due to 
the fact that the regulation of over-indebtedness of consumers and of reckless credit (which is 
an undesirable lending practice) were unknown to South African law at that time. 
 
To analyse the context of the statute as a whole we must look at all aspects of the Act such as 
the preamble and the objects and the purposes of the Act, as well as the structure of the Act in 
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order to discover the context of the Act as a whole.  Firstly, let us consider the preamble of 
the Act.  The preamble to the National Credit Act states as follows: 
 
“To promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit and 
for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit and improved 
standards of consumer information; to promote black economic empowerment and 
ownership within the consumer credit industry; to prohibit certain unfair credit and 
credit-marketing practices; to promote responsible credit granting and use and for 
that purpose to prohibit reckless credit granting; to provide for debt re-organisation 
in cases of over-indebtedness; to regulate credit information; to provide for registration 
of credit bureaux, credit providers and debt counselling services; to establish national 
norms and standards relating to consumer credit; to promote a consistent enforcement 
framework relating to consumer credit; to establish the National Credit Regulator and the 
National Consumer Tribunal; to repeal the Usury Act, 1968, and the Credit Agreements 
Act,1980; and to provide for related incidental matters.”157 
 
From the preamble we can see that one of the objects of the National Credit Act is to prohibit 
reckless credit and to promote responsible credit granting by credit providers.  From the 
preamble it can also be seen that another object of the National Credit Act is an attempt to try 
and avoid over-indebtedness and in such cases where it is unavoidable, to provide a 
mechanism in terms of which the consumer’s debts may be re-organised.  From this it can be 
concluded that the legislature considers both these concepts worthy of regulation and worth 
the effort to put measures into place in order to avoid them.  Interesting to note is that the 
preamble deals with the issues of over-indebtedness and reckless credit concurrently.  While 
some might argue that this is merely a coincidence, this trend is continued throughout the Act 
in the purposes section and in respect of Part D of Chapter 4 of the National Credit Act which 
is entitled “Over-indebtedness and reckless credit” and which is the part of the act which 
regulates and defines both concepts.  From this, it may be concluded that the legislature itself 
considers the two concepts interrelated. 
 
The purposes of the National Credit were set out above.  I would like to reiterate the purposes 
of the National Credit Act in order to fully analyse the purposes of the National Credit Act 
dealing specifically with the concepts of over-indebtedness and reckless credit.  The purposes 
of the National Credit Act are set out in section 3 and are: 
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The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, 
effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers, by- 
a) promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, 
and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access credit under 
sustainable market conditions; 
b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit providers; 
c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by- 
i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and fulfilment 
of financial obligations by consumers; and 
ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default by 
consumers; 
d) promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers; 
e) addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and 
credit providers by- 
i) providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights; 
ii) providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised information in order 
to make informed choices; and 
iii) providing consumers with protection from deception, and from unfair or fraudulent 
conduct by credit providers and credit bureaux; 
f) improving consumer credit information and reporting and regulation of credit bureaux; 
g) addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing mechanisms 
for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer 
of all responsible financial obligations; 
h) providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements; and 
i) providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement and 
judgment, which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer 
obligations under credit agreements.
158
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The objects listed in the preamble are restated and expanded upon in the purposes section.  It 
would be appropriate, at this point, to distinguish between the concepts of general over-
indebtedness and reckless over-indebtedness.
159
  Reckless over-indebtedness results when the 
granting of reckless credit by the credit provider caused the consumer to become over-
indebted.  All other instances where this is not the case would be classified as an instance of 
general over-indebtedness.   
 
It has been said that the purposes of the National Credit Act can be described as both 
preventative and rehabilitative.
160
  Proceeding from this statement, let us consider each 
concept individually.  The purposes of the act with respect to general over-indebtedness can 
be considered to be both rehabilitative and, to a limited extent, preventative.  The reason the 
purposes of the act with respect to general over-indebtedness is only partially preventative is 
because the legislature will usually have no control over an individual’s circumstances, so 
that as an individual’s circumstances change he might no longer be able to satisfy his debts as 
they fall due.  This could be the case, for instance, where the consumer loses his job and is 
unable to satisfy his obligations.  Some might argue that the legislature has no control in such 
circumstances and that the purpose of the act will be purely rehabilitative in such cases.  
Purely rehabilitative because the most the legislature can do in such situations is to provide a 
rehabilitative mechanism when circumstances beyond their control arise.  However, I do not  
agree with that argument. The emphasis in the purposes section of the National Credit Act 
has been placed on improving consumer credit information and reporting by the credit 
bureaux.  Prior to the National Credit Act, credit bureaux were unregulated and could do as 
they pleased.  Now, however, the National Credit Act has set out to regulate credit bureaux.  
Otto describes the role played by credit bureaux as follows: 
 
“Although credit bureaux have limited “powers” and functions, they play an important 
role by, for example, providing credit providers with information that could prevent over-
indebtedness of consumers and the granting of reckless credit.”161 
 
Credit bureaux are obliged to accept the filing of all consumer credit information received 
from a credit provider.
162
  They must ensure that any information received by them in respect 
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of a consumer is accurate.  Credit bureaux will primarily be approached by credit providers 
when a consumer approaches them for credit and a credit assessment must be done.  By 
improving the information held by credit bureaux, this will have a “spill down” effect on the 
information held by credit providers as they are required to do a credit assessment prior to the 
conclusion of each new credit agreement.
163
  With more accurate information about the 
consumer’s financial means, prospects and obligations, more informed decisions can be 
made, thus reducing the instances of general over-indebtedness. 
 
Even with the most accurate information available to the credit provider, it may still not 
prevent all instances of general over-indebtedness.  In cases where the consumer loses his 
job, for instance, the legislature has done its utmost to ensure that the consumer will not 
become over-indebted.  The legislature did this by stating that one of the underlying purposes 
of the National Credit Act was to make “provision for a consistent and accessible system of 
consensual resolution of disputes arising from credit agreements”.164  While this purpose is 
usually used to imply that credit providers must act in good faith during the debt counselling 
process, I see no reason why it cannot be extended to include negotiations between the credit 
provider and the consumer where general over-indebtedness is impending.  This will give the 
consumer the opportunity to discuss the reasons for his impending over-indebtedness and 
allow the parties to come to a mutually beneficial agreement without the need for the 
intervention of the court or debt counsellors.  This is an especially powerful preventative 
measure, especially in the case of the low-income sector of society who is usually only a 
party to one or two credit agreements.  If credit providers are obliged to negotiate in good 
faith, we may see more consumers who have lost their jobs and are on the brink of general 
over-indebtedness, trying to re-organise their obligations inter partes and thus avoiding 
general over-indebtedness. 
 
Clearly the argument that the National Credit Act’s only purpose is rehabilitative with respect 
to general over-indebtedness is incorrect.  The legislature has done everything within its 
power, apart from guaranteeing people will never lose their jobs or that other such bad things 
will happen to them, to attempt to prevent consumers from becoming over-indebted.  Thus 
we can conclude that the purpose of the National Credit Act with respect to general over-
indebtedness is both rehabilitative and preventative. 
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This is the same as the purpose of the National Credit Act is concerned with respect to cases 
of reckless over-indebtedness.  One of the stated purposes of the National Credit Act is to 
prevent reckless credit and accordingly the purpose would also have to be preventative 
because reckless over-indebtedness is over-indebtedness that has been caused by the granting 
of reckless credit.  If reckless credit granting were to be prevented, so too would reckless 
over-indebtedness be prevented.  However the legislature also provides mechanisms for 
rehabilitation where the consumer has become over-indebted as a result of the granting of 
reckless credit by the credit provider.  Thus, the purpose of the National Credit Act, with 
respect to reckless over-indebtedness, is both preventative and rehabilitative. 
 
This is also the same position with respect to the purposes of the National Credit Act with 
respect to reckless credit.  The National Credit Act is very clear in that it attempts to prevent 
credit providers from ever entering into a credit agreement that could be classified as reckless 
credit by imposing stringent assessment requirements and sanctions in the case of a failure to 
fulfil those requirements.  However, as was stated above, one of the weaknesses of the pre- 
National Credit Act dispensation was the “reckless behaviour by credit providers and 
exploitation of consumers”.165  Prior to the promulgation of the National Credit Act, there 
was no duty on credit providers to perform credit assessments to see if consumers could 
afford the terms of the deal they were entering into.  Credit providers were free to do as they 
pleased and this led to “rising levels of over-indebtedness”.166  The National Credit Act was 
drafted with the purpose of rehabilitating credit providers and restrict the reckless lending 
practices employed by those self-same credit providers prior to the promulgation of the 
National Credit Act.  Thus we could surmise that the purpose of the National Credit Act with 
respect to reckless credit is definitively preventative but also to a certain extent rehabilitative. 
 
In summary the purposes of the act with respect to the above mentioned concepts are: 
1. Reckless over-indebtedness – both preventative and rehabilitative. 
2. General over-indebtedness – both preventative and rehabilitative. 
3. Reckless credit – both preventative and rehabilitative. 
                                                          
165
 Kelly-Louw “Introduction to the National Credit Act” 2007 Juta’s Business Law 147 147. 
166
 Kelly-Louw (n 165) 147. 
42 
 
Thus, the purposes of the National Credit Act with respect to the concepts of over-
indebtedness and reckless credit are the same.  The purposes are both preventative and 
rehabilitative. 
5.6 Concepts of over-indebtedness and insolvency revisited 
However, as was shown earlier when the concepts of over-indebtedness and insolvency were 
investigated, there is quite a bit of overlap between these concepts.  While some might argue 
that there may be a distinction between the concepts of actual insolvency and over-
indebtedness, the concepts of commercial insolvency and over-indebtedness seem to be very 
similar.  The reason people might argue that the concepts of over-indebtedness and actual 
insolvency are dissimilar is because the definition of over-indebtedness has to do with 
someone’s current cash flow position167 while the concept of actual insolvency has to do with 
someone’s balance sheet status.168  However, what is often overlooked when defining the 
concept of over-indebtedness is the portion of the concept that refers to the consumers 
“financial means, prospects, obligations and history of debt repayment.”169  A poignant 
statement regarding these concepts was made by the court in the case Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd v Panayiotts:
170
 
 
“Having regard to the wording of section 79, such proof must inevitably involve details of 
inter alia, the consumer’s financial means, prospects and obligations.  Financial means 
would include not only income and expenses, but also assets and liabilities.  Prospects 
would include prospects of improving the consumer’s financial position, such as 
increases, and even, liquidating assets.”171 
“In the case of an instalment agreement, secured loan, lease or mortgage agreement (all of 
which involves goods as the subject matter of the agreement), the consumer’s financial 
means and prospects must include the prospect of selling the goods in order to reduce the 
consumer’s indebtedness.”172   
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Clearly from the statement quoted above, the concept of over-indebtedness cannot simply be 
classified as a cash flow type test.  The concept of over-indebtedness involves much more 
than a cash flow analysis; it includes an analysis of the entirety of the consumers’ assets, 
liabilities, income and expenses.  Clearly this is very similar to the concept of actual 
insolvency that is used by the court to determine if a debtor is insolvent.  Thus it could be 
said that when the court is approached by a debtor himself to grant a voluntary surrender 
order or when the court is approached by a creditor/s for an order of compulsory 
sequestration, the court will simultaneously be considering deciding whether or not the debtor 
is insolvent and (maybe without even realizing it) whether the consumer is over-indebted. 
 
The interesting point on this is that if we consider the wording of the National Credit Act, the 
court may not consider the issue of over-indebtedness without one of the parties to the matter 
alleging that the debtor is over-indebted.  This is interesting because even though the 
National Credit Act doesn’t allow the court to investigate whether or not the consumer is 
over-indebted without an allegation to that effect, in insolvency proceedings, as was shown 
above, the court will basically be investigating whether or not the debtor is over-indebted as 
the concepts are substantively similar.  However, no court has yet decided upon this issue and 
thus there is no case law backing for the argument above and as things stand now, the court 
cannot mero motu consider the issue of over-indebtedness in insolvency proceedings. 
5.7 Conclusion 
From the above we can see that presently the court cannot investigate whether a debtor in 
insolvency proceedings is over-indebted and due to the way insolvency proceeding occur in 
practice, it will almost certainly never be able to declare any of the debtor’s credit agreements 
to be an instance of reckless credit provision.  This is clearly contrary to the stated purposes 
of the National Credit Act and requires reconsideration.  As we can see from the reasons for 
drafting the provisions relating to over-indebtedness and reckless credit, the legislature 
thought it very important to prevent persons from becoming over-indebted and organizations 
granting credit recklessly. The legislature also thought it equally important to try rehabilitate 
consumers who had become over-indebted and organizations who were previously granting 
credit very recklessly.  Clearly, the way the act is worded, these purposes are not being 
achieved.  It is for this reason that I believe the National Credit Act requires an amendment to 
its provisions dealing with over-indebtedness.  The type of amendment which should be made 
44 
 
to the National Credit Act, is that a portion of the provision dealing with over-indebtedness 
should be deleted to fix the defect in the legislation.  I propose that we should use the section 
which gives the court the mero motu capacity to investigate reckless credit as an example 
when amending the section dealing with over-indebtedness.  Thus, the amended section 85 
should look like something like this: 
 
Despite any provision of law or agreement to the contrary, in any court 
proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered, the court may- 
 
This amended section 85 would give the court the capacity to mero motu investigate whether 
or not the consumer is over-indebted in any proceedings where a credit agreement is being 
considered.  Amending the act in this manner would allow the court, in appropriate 
circumstances, to refer a debtor for debt review.  This would solve the problem of the court 
not being able to determine whether a credit agreement listed in an insolvency application 
amounts to reckless credit because the debt counsellor would be allowed to go investigate 
each individual credit agreement in a lot more detail to determine this.  It would also grant the 
court the necessary authority to investigate if a debtor is over-indebted as an alternative 
procedure to sequestration.   
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6 Does the issuance of Form 17.1 of the National Credit Act amount to 
an act of insolvency? 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The next issue which requires some investigation relates to the question whether the issuance 
and receipt of Form 17.1 by the credit provider amounts to an act of insolvency.  After a 
consumer has applied for debt review, the debt counsellor must notify all the credit providers 
listed in the application together with every registered credit bureau of the fact that the 
consumer has applied for debt review.
173
  The debt counsellor must do this by completing 
Form 17.1 and delivering it within five business days of the date the consumer applied for 
debt review.
174
   
 
If a credit provider decides to approach the court for a compulsory sequestration order, the 
credit provider must allege and prove that: 
 the applicant has established a claim which entitles him, in terms of section 9(1), to 
apply for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate; and 
 the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and 
 there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of the creditors of the debtor, if 
his estate is sequestrated.
175
 
 
As stated above, the creditor will usually not be in a position to prove that the debtor’s 
liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets fairly valued and thus the creditor will in most 
cases rely upon the acts of insolvency which are listed in section 8 of the Insolvency Act 
which provides as follows: 
 
“A debtor commits an act of insolvency- 
a) if he leaves the Republic or being out of the Republic remains absent there from, or 
departs from his dwelling or otherwise absents himself, with intent by so doing to 
evade or delay the payment of his debts; 
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b) if a court has given judgment against him and he fails, upon the demand of the officer 
whose duty it is to execute that judgment, to satisfy it or to indicate to that officer 
disposable property sufficient to satisfy it, or if it appears from the return made by that 
officer that he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy the judgment; 
c) if he makes or attempts to make any disposition of any of his property which has or 
would have the effect of prejudicing his creditors or of preferring one creditor above 
another; 
d) if he removes or attempts to remove any of his property with intent to prejudice his 
creditors or to prefer one creditor above another; 
e) if he makes or offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors for releasing 
him wholly or partially from his debts; 
f) if, after having published a notice of surrender of his estate which has not lapsed or 
been withdrawn in terms of section six or seven, he fails to comply with the 
requirements of sub-section (3) of section four or lodges, in terms of that sub-section, 
a statement which is incorrect or incomplete in any material respect or fails to apply 
for the acceptance of the surrender of his estate on the date mentioned in the aforesaid 
notice as the date on which such application is to be made; 
g) if he gives notice in writing to any one of his creditors that he is unable to pay any of 
his debts; 
h) if, being a trader, he gives notice in the Gazette in terms of sub-section (1) of section 
thirty-four, and is thereafter unable to pay all his debts.”176 
 
The act of insolvency we will be directing our attention towards will be the act of insolvency 
described in section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act.  Section 8(g) describes that act of insolvency 
which is constituted by the debtor giving notice, in writing, to any one of his creditors stating 
that he is unable to pay any of his debts.  The question this section will be asking, will be 
whether or not the issuance of Form 17.1 by the debt counsellor to each of the consumer’s 
credit providers, amounts to the act of insolvency set out in section 8(g) of the Insolvency 
Act.  If this were to be the case, credit providers could, upon receipt of Form 17.1, simply 
apply for the sequestration of the consumer instead of adopting a “wait and see” attitude 
towards debt review;  “wait and see” in the sense that the credit provider can ordinarily not 
                                                          
176
 s 8 of the Insolvency Act. 
47 
 
do anything but co-operate in good faith during the legislated period set out for the debt 
review.
177
 
 
6.2 Can an act of insolvency be committed by someone other than 
the debtor? 
 
The first question that must be answered is whether or not the written notice of the debtor’s 
inability to pay any of his debts can be given by any party other than the debtor himself.  
Thus, the question as it relates to our enquiry, is whether or not a debt counsellor can give 
such a notice on behalf of the debtor.  In English law it has been consistently held that an act 
of insolvency can only be committed by the debtor himself and that it cannot be committed 
through an agent.
178
  If this were to be the case in South African law, the enquiry would end 
there, and the answer to the inquiry would be negative.  However, South African law does not 
adopt the viewpoint that acts of insolvency are personal, as is the English law approach.  In 
the case of Goldblatt’s Wholesale (Pty) Ltd v Damalis179 it was held that a letter sent by the 
attorneys of the respondent to all the respondent’s creditors, to the effect that the respondent 
would be unable to meet its liabilities and would require an extension of time to meet all its 
obligations, amounted to an act of insolvency.
180
  In this case it was held that an act of 
insolvency could be committed through the actions of an agent.  The same was held in the 
case Chenille Industries v Vorster
181
 where the attorney sent a letter stating “My client finds 
herself in financial straits, not being able to meet her obligations on due dates”182 and “The 
business appears to have excellent possibilities and should possibly at a later stage be able to 
pay creditors.”183  The court in this case held that  an agent, such as an attorney in casu, who 
is properly authorised in writing and who acts within the knowledge and consent of the 
principal, can commit an act of insolvency on behalf of his principal.
184
  However, this rule 
only applies where the agent commits acts of insolvency with the requisite authority, 
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knowledge and consent of the principal.  This rule has also been extended to situations where 
a principal has given an agent wide powers to perform acts on behalf of the principal.
185
  
Thus, an act committed by an agent of the principal in the course of the management of the 
principal’s affairs may amount to an act of insolvency; even if the principal was unaware the 
agent committed such an act of insolvency.
186
  Thus, an act committed by an agent in the 
execution of a general or specific mandate may amount to an act of insolvency. 
 
Proceeding from that point of view, it would behove us to look at the legal relationship 
between a debt counsellor and a debtor.  If it amounts to something akin to agency, then at 
least one of the requirements for the act of insolvency described in section 8(g) of the 
Insolvency Act will be met.   
 
Agency has the following requirements: 
1. It is based on a contract; 
2. in terms of which  one person, the agent, acts with authority flowing from: 
a. a contract of mandate; or 
b. an employment contract; or 
c. estoppel; or 
d. ratification; or 
e. by operation of law; 
3. the agent performs a juristic act on behalf of another person, the principal; and 
4. the act has the result that the principal acquires all the rights and duties flowing from 
the juristic act.
187
 
 
The first question that must necessarily be asked is whether or not the relationship between a 
debtor and the debt counsellor has a contractual basis.  A contract can succinctly be described 
as an agreement which will bring about a legal obligation.
188
  There are five requirements 
which must be met before a valid contract can come into existence.  The first is that there 
must be consensus between the parties.  This means that the parties must have corresponding 
intentions with respect to the proposed contract and the intention to be bound to the juristic 
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consequences of the proposed contract.
189
  Corresponding intentions means that the debtor’s 
offer to conclude a contract for debt review with the debt counsellor corresponds with the 
debt counsellor’s acceptance of the offer.  A debtor will be said to make an offer when he 
makes an application to the debt counsellor with the intention that by its mere acceptance, a 
contract shall be formed.
190
  Thus the application/offer will have to contain the requisite 
information for a debt counsellor to make an informed acceptance to the offer.  The National 
Credit Regulations provide that the debtor must either make application by completing and 
submitting Form 16
191
 or by providing the debt counsellor with certain required information, 
including financial information regarding income, expenses and all the credit agreements to 
which the debtor is a party.
192
  With this information contained in the application for debt 
review, the debt counsellor will be able to make an informed acceptance to the offer.  Thus it 
should be possible for the parties to reach consensus and thereby satisfy the first contractual 
requirement.   
 
The second requirement of contractual capacity will almost certainly be met in each instance.  
This is due to the fact, firstly, that debt counsellors must meet certain criteria in order to be 
registered as such.  One of the disqualifications listed in the National Credit Act state that 
persons under the age of 18 years, as well as mentally unfit persons, may not apply to be a 
debt counsellor.
193
  Thus, only major persons of sound mind may be registered as debt 
counsellors.  Secondly, if the debtor is validly a party to credit agreements, this already 
entails that he will have contractual capacity due to the fact that credit agreements are 
contracts and that the debtor would have had to have contractual capacity in order to 
conclude those credit agreements.  If the debtor did not have contractual capacity at the 
conclusion of the credit agreements, the debtor can attack the credit agreement to which he is 
a party on the basis of lack of contractual capacity.
194
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The third requirement for a valid contract is that the contract must be lawful.  This 
requirement basically entails that the contract must not be contrary to our common law, 
statutory law, public policy or  good morals.
195
  Clearly, concluding a contract in order to 
achieve the stated purposes of the National Credit Act cannot be unlawful.  One of the stated 
purposes of the National Credit Act is to address and prevent the over-indebtedness of 
consumers, and to provide mechanisms in order to resolve over-indebtedness...
196
  One of the 
mechanisms to resolve over-indebtedness includes applying to a debt counsellor for debt 
review.  Thus, a contract to conduct a debt review cannot be unlawful. 
 
The fourth requirement is physical possibility and certainty.  This requirement entails that the 
performance must be determined or at least determinable at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.
197
  With respect to the issue of performance, I believe it can be argued that the 
performance will be determinable with sufficient certainty due to the fact that the application 
for debt review will contain all the information necessary for the debt counsellor to perform 
his duties adequately.  The act and regulations spell out how the debt counsellor should go 
about determining whether or not the debtor is over-indebted and whether or not any of the 
credit agreements amounts to reckless credit.  Thus, the offer/application will make the 
performance of the debt counsellor’s duties in terms of the contract easily determinable.  
 
The last requirement for a valid contract is that any prescribed formalities must be complied 
with.  These formalities can either be prescribed by statute or by the parties themselves.
198
  
One of the formalities listed in the regulations is that the application must either be made by 
completing Form 16 or by providing the debt counsellor with certain listed information.
199
  A 
further requirement prescribed by the regulations is that the debtor must pay the debt 
counsellor’s fee.200  If the debtor complies with the formalities,  the contract will be formally 
valid. 
 
From the above it can be surmised that the relationship between the debt counsellor and the 
debtor can be said to arise by way of an underlying contract.  This means that the first 
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requirement of agency, that is that the agency is based on contract, is met in the majority of 
cases. 
 
The second requirement of agency is that the agent must act with the authority flowing from 
certain contracts, estoppel, ratification or by operation of law.
201
  First, let us disqualify the 
rather obvious sources of authority like the acquisition of authority via an employment 
contract, estoppel and ratification.  Case law has already stated how to distinguish between an 
employee and an agent.  In the case of Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekerings 
Genootskap AVBOB
202
 it was held that the difference between an agent and an employee is 
that the agent is not subject to the control and authority of his principal, but that the agent can 
act independently and use his own discretion when acting.
203
  The application for debt review 
merely consists of a request that the debt counsellor investigate whether or not the listed 
debtor is over-indebted, it does not state anything regarding the manner in which the 
investigation must proceed or that the debt counsellor is subject to the control and authority 
of the debtor.  When the debt counsellor performs the legislated duties required of him during 
the debt review, the debt counsellor is not subject to the control and authority of the debtor.  
The debt counsellor merely takes the instruction from the debtor and then proceeds with the 
debt review using his own personal discretion.  Clearly the relationship between the debt 
counsellor and the debtor cannot amount to a relationship underlined by an employment 
contract.  Estoppel as a source of authority is just as unlikely due to the fact that during the 
debt review the debtor is not involved in the investigation conducted by the debt counsellor.  
The debt counsellor conducts the investigation by himself, without assistance from the 
debtor, and thus there will be no opportunity for the debtor to create a pretence to creditors 
that someone is acting as his debt counsellor.  Ratification would not work in the case under 
discussion due to the fact that debt counsellor will, in all likelihood, not conduct a debt 
review without a request from a consumer.   
 
That leaves either a contract of mandate or the operation of law as the source of authority.  
First, let us consider whether or not the source of authority can be explained by a contract of 
mandate.  A contract of mandate usually takes the form of a request that the agent concludes 
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a contract on behalf of the principal.
204
  The question then is how this would relate to the 
situation under discussion.  It could be argued that by giving the debt counsellor the 
application for debt review, what you are in fact doing is asking the debt counsellor to 
investigate whether or not the consumer is over-indebted.  If the debt counsellor finds that the 
consumer is not over-indebted, but is nevertheless experiencing, or is likely to experience, 
difficulty satisfying all his obligations, the debt counsellor must attempt a voluntary 
rescheduling of the debts.  This voluntary rescheduling of the debts will be in the form of a 
debt restructuring agreement.  If consented to by the credit providers, the debt restructuring 
agreement must be filed in court as a consent order.
205
  This debt restructuring agreement can 
be seen as the contract to which the contract of mandate is directed at concluding.  If after the 
investigation the debt counsellor concludes that the consumer is over-indebted, the debt 
counsellor can issue a proposal to the court that the court make certain orders.
206
  Even this 
proposal could be seen as a suspensive debt restructuring agreement, if one assumes that the 
debt counsellor contacted the creditors to see if they were willing to accept the terms 
proposed in the debt restructuring agreement that forms the basis of the proposal issued to the 
court.  The suspensive condition lies in the acceptance by the court of the debt counsellor’s 
finding of over-indebtedness and his attempt at restructuring the consumer’s debts.  Seen in 
this manner, it could be argued that the consumer concludes a contract of mandate with the 
debt counsellor in order to reschedule the consumer’s debts. 
 
The other alternative source of authority is that the debt counsellor acquires his authority to 
act as the agent of the debtor by operation of law.  This would probably be a better alternative 
source of authority than the acquisition via a contract of mandate.  The position of debt 
counsellor was created by the National Credit Act and acquires its powers and duties from 
there.  One such power given by the National Credit Act is to investigate the financial 
position of the consumer and attempt a voluntary rescheduling of the debts. 
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6.3 First Rand Bank Limited v Evans 
 
In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v Evans
207
 the respondent borrowed large sums of 
money from the applicant.  By June 2009 the respondent owed the applicant around 
R2 800 000.  It is this indebtedness that gave rise to the application for provisional 
sequestration.
208
  The applicant brought the application on two grounds: Firstly, the applicant 
argued that the respondent committed the act of insolvency described in section 8(g) of the 
Insolvency Act; secondly the applicant argued that the respondent was factually insolvent.
209
  
The respondent applied for debt review on 29 January 2009.
210
  FNB was notified that the 
respondent was under debt review (nothing is reported as to the manner of this notification 
and thus I believe that it would be a justifiable conclusion to assume that FNB was notified of 
the debt review via the issuance and receipt of Form 17.1 by the respondent’s debt 
counsellor).  However, it is not Form 17.1 that the applicant relies upon as being the act of 
insolvency.  On 17 April 2009 the respondent addressed a letter to the applicant that is 
alleged to be a section 8(g) act of insolvency.
211
  The contents of the letter are shown below: 
 
“Subject: Cancellation of Debit Order. 
Account No.00 00 30 00 01 11 03 714. 
 
To Whom it may Concern. 
 
I have a commercial loan on the account number above. Your records should show 
that I am under Debt Review. Ref#F12437. 
 
As a result, the bond repayment is being renegotiated and administered through the 
Courts. The repayments will be made via the Attorneys Trust Account shortly. 
 
With this in mind, please cancel the Debit Order on the old arrangement against my 
Standard Bank account 25-254-694-6. 
 
Please contact me if this cannot be done as I have requested.”212 
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The court then goes on to argue that the letter states that the applicant is under debt review.  
The court continues this train of thought by stating that this means that the respondent applied 
for debt review in terms of section 86(1) of the National Credit Act and that the sole purpose 
behind such an application for debt review is to obtain a declaration of over-indebtedness.
213
  
The court proceeds by stating that “a debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for, 
or is under, debt review is necessarily informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and 
unable to pay his debts.”214  The court also goes on further to state that the proper approach to 
adopt in order to determine if such a letter constitutes the act of insolvency described in 
section 8(g) is to consider how it would be understood by a reasonable person in the position 
of the creditor receiving the letter.
215
  The court in casu held that what was required of the 
credit provider was to show that the impression created by the notice and the surrounding 
circumstances created an unequivocal statement that the consumer was unable to pay his 
debts.
216
  In casu the court decided that the letter, together with the fact that the respondent 
was significantly in default of his obligations under his credit agreements with the applicant 
would have been interpreted by a reasonable person in the position of the credit provider as 
an unequivocal notification that the respondent was unable to satisfy his obligations and the 
letter accordingly amounted to the act of insolvency described in section 8(g) of the 
Insolvency Act.
217
  Importing the abovementioned rule with respect to agents, the general 
rule stated by the court could be stated to mean this: A debtor, or his duly authorised agent, 
who informs his creditor that he has applied for, or is under, debt review is necessarily 
informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and unable to pay his debts and has 
consequently committed the act of insolvency described in section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act 
if a reasonable person in the position of the creditor would reach the conclusion that the letter 
and the surrounding circumstances, which are known to the creditor, amount to an 
unequivocal statement that the consumer is unable to pay his debts.  Thus the test to be 
applied to see if the creditor’s conduct is reasonable is an objective test.  The test is objective 
in the sense that the creditor’s interpretation of the letter and surrounding circumstances is 
weighed against the notional reasonable person in the position of the creditor to see if the 
creditor’s interpretation accords with the interpretation of the notional reasonable person.  If 
the notional reasonable person would not have come to the conclusion, taking into account all 
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the surrounding circumstances, that the letter indicated an inability to pay his debts, then the 
issuance of the notice will not amount to the act of insolvency mentioned in section 8(g). 
 
The question that I would like to posit is whether or not the court erred in its finding that the 
sole purpose behind an application for debt review is to obtain a declaration of over-
indebtedness.  This conclusion of the court is not entirely correct.  The outcomes of a debt 
review are threefold: 
1. That the consumer is not over-indebted.218 
2. That the consumer is not over-indebted, but is nevertheless experiencing, or likely to 
experience, difficulty satisfying all the consumer’s obligations under credit 
agreements in a timely manner.
219
 
3. That the consumer is over-indebted.220 
According to the National Credit Act, a consumer can apply for debt review without being 
over-indebted.  It is always possible that a consumer applies for debt review as a delaying 
tactic.  It could definitely be used as an effective delaying tactic because of the moratorium 
against enforcement actions which comes into operation upon the initiation of the debt 
review.  Thus, a consumer who applies for debt review as a delaying tactic is not 
unequivocally notifying the creditor that he is unable to pay his debts.  Simply considered 
from this abuse of process viewpoint, the court’s conclusion that the sole purpose of applying 
for debt review is to be declared over-indebted, cannot be sustained.  Further a consumer can 
apply for debt review when he is experiencing “difficulty” in satisfying all his obligations 
under the credit agreements to which he is a party with the expectation that the debt 
counsellor will negotiate with the consumer and his credit providers with the view towards a 
voluntary debt rearrangement, which can, provided the parties consent to the proposal, be 
filed as a consent order.
221
  This “difficulty” must be something short of over-indebtedness 
(inability to satisfy all his obligations under all his credit agreements in a timely manner) and 
thus it is possible for the consumer to apply for debt review even in instances where the 
consumer is not over-indebted but merely experiencing financial difficulty in satisfying his 
obligations under his credit agreements.  The court held that what was required was an 
unequivocal statement that the consumer was unable to pay his debts.  The definition of 
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“unequivocal” is having only one possible meaning or interpretation.222  Clearly there is more 
than one possible reason for applying for debt review whether it be as an abuse of the process 
or in the hope that the debt counsellor will find you in financial difficulty and attempt a re-
arrangement of your debts.  Thus, I believe that it cannot be held, as the court in casu did, 
that by giving a credit provider notice of a consumer’s application for debt review, it would 
necessarily amount to an unequivocal notice that the consumer is unable to pay his debts.   
 
6.4 First Rand Bank Limited v Janse van Rensburg 
 
In the case of First Rand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg
223
 the court was again tasked with a 
matter that touches upon the main issue we are evaluating without deciding the issue of 
whether the receipt of a Form 17.1 letter constitutes an act of insolvency outright.  The matter 
before the court involved two separate unopposed applications by the applicant for the 
provisional sequestration of a husband and wife married out of community of property.
224
  
Due to the fact that the legal and factual issues were identical, the court prepared a single 
judgement dealing with these issues.
225
  The applicant’s application is founded solely upon 
the allegation that the act of insolvency as described in section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act was 
committed when the applicant received a letter informing it that the respondents had applied 
for debt review.
226
  The letter informing the applicant of this fact was not Form 17.1, it was 
rather a consumer profile report issued by a registered credit bureau.
227
  The applicant alleges 
that the issued consumer profile report of the credit bureau, when delivered to the creditor, 
amounts to the act of insolvency described in section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act.  The 
consumer profile report in this case contained no details regarding the terms of the 
application for debt review, also no reference was made to the statements and declarations 
made by the consumer in the application and accordingly the court held that the consumer 
profile report did not contain any information upon which a reasonable person in the position 
of the creditor could come to the conclusion that the consumer is unequivocally stating an 
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inability to pay his or her debts.
228
  The court also states that the applicant in this case must 
rely upon inferential reasoning to conclude that any notice that has been given to the credit 
provider stating that the consumer has applied for debt review amounts to the unequivocal 
statement of an inability to pay.
229
  The applicant tried to argue that by applying for debt 
review, the consumer is necessarily informing his credit providers that he is over-indebted 
and thus that he is unable to pay one or more of his debts.  Goosen J disagreed with this 
argument, and stated that “such inferential reasoning is not only unsound it is contrary to the 
express requirements of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act which require the written notice 
by a debtor to the creditor of inability to pay his or her debts.”230   
 
An interesting point to take note of is the approach by Goosen J  as to whether or not a credit 
bureau can act as an agent of the consumer.  This is important, as was shown above, due to 
the fact that only acts of an agent acting with a general or specific mandate can amount to an 
act of insolvency.  Goosen J held that there is no basis (general or specific) upon which it can 
be said that the credit bureau acted on the authority of the respondents.
231
  Thus any 
consumer profile report issued by a credit bureau cannot be relied upon by credit providers as 
amounting to an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. 
6.5 Otto’s views 
 
Otto also briefly deals with some of the issues discussed in this dissertation.  He states: 
 
“It can also be argued that the Act provides for a unique procedure, namely debt review 
and the consequent rearrangement of debts, and that this well-intentioned legislative 
initiative will be frustrated if sequestration may ipso iure follow upon an application for 
debt review.”232 
 
While Otto approaches the problem from a different perspective to the one developed here, 
he recognises the import of the debt review procedure and the increasing significance the 
process will have in South Africa.  Otto opines that the National Credit Act should enjoy 
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preference over the Insolvency Act in this particular case and that the issuance of Form 17.1 
by a debt counsellor should not be considered to be an act of insolvency allowing a creditor 
to apply for the compulsory sequestration of the debtor.
233
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
It is a bit unfortunate that in both cases under discussion, the court was not asked to consider 
whether or not Form 17.1 amounts to an act of insolvency.  However, I believe the court in 
First Rand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg
234
 gave us sufficient information in dealing with 
the consumer profile report that we can make an informed decision regarding the treatment of 
Form 17.1.  Ignoring the fact that the credit bureau did not have the authority to act on behalf 
of the consumer, Goosen J held that the consumer profile report did not contain the requisite 
information to unequivocally reach the conclusion that the consumer is unable to repay one or 
more of his debts.  I believe the same can be said of Form 17.1.  Below is the prescribed 
format of Form 17.1. 
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From the above it is clear that there is not much information that is required to be filled in on 
Form 17.1.  The only requisite information is the personal details of the consumer and the 
debt counsellor.  This is quite similar to the information that was found in the consumer 
profile report in First Rand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg.
235
  As stated above, the court 
found that the consumer profile report did not contain any information upon which a 
reasonable person in the position of the creditor could come to the conclusion that the 
consumer is unequivocally stating an inability to pay their debts.
236
  Form 17.1 contains no 
information regarding the terms of the application for debt review, it also contains no 
information regarding the declarations and statements made by the consumer when applying 
for debt counselling and thus it can be said that the information contained in Form 17.1 is on 
par with the information contained in a consumer profile report.  Thus, it would be 
appropriate to equate the treatment of the consumer profile report to the manner Form 17.1 
should be treated by the court.  Thus, it is my belief that due to the fact that Form 17.1 does 
not contain the requisite information for a reasonable person in the position of the credit 
provider to come to the conclusion that the consumer is unequivocally stating an inability to 
pay one or more of his debts, it must of necessity mean that the issuance of Form 17.1 by a 
debt counsellor will not amount to an act of insolvency. 
 
Otto, in his brief dealings with this subject, states that the National Credit Act should enjoy 
preference over the Insolvency Act in this specific area.
237
  While Otto’s motivation for his 
opinion considers the import of the debt review process in society, he reaches the same 
conclusion that I have reached from my analysis of the National Credit Act and decided case 
law. 
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7. Summary 
 
This dissertation sets out to investigate the manner in which the relatively recent National 
Credit Act has impacted on insolvency proceedings which are regulated by the much older 
Insolvency Act.  Both acts regulate the position of persons who are experiencing financial 
difficulties and thus it is not surprising that both acts could be applied to the same set of 
circumstances.  However, the acts have very different aims which they attempt to achieve.  
The purpose of the Insolvency Act has always been held to be very pro-creditor while most of 
the latter credit legislation has become more pro-consumer.  However, as was shown above, 
in matters requiring the application of the National Credit Act and the Insolvency Act, 
cognizance must now be taken of both the interests of the consumer/debtor and credit 
provider/creditor. 
 
With respect to the application of the acts to a set of circumstances, the only parties to whom 
the National Credit Act and the Insolvency Act could apply concurrently would be natural 
persons and partnerships and the estates of those natural persons and partnerships and certain 
trusts.  However, when the issue of over-indebtedness, reckless credit and debt review are at 
issue in insolvency proceedings, the only party to whom the National Credit Act could apply 
are natural persons.  Thus the focus of this dissertation has mainly been on the situation 
where the debtor is a natural person. 
 
Due to the manner in which the National Credit Act has been drafted the court cannot 
investigate whether a debtor in insolvency proceedings is over-indebted and due to the way 
insolvency proceeding occur in practice, the court will almost certainly never be able to 
declare any of the debtor’s credit agreements to be reckless credit.  This is clearly contrary to 
the stated purposes of the National Credit Act and thus it is for this reason that I believe the 
National Credit Act requires an amendment to its provisions to allow the court to mero motu 
consider whether a debtor is over-indebted and to refer a debtor for debt review in the 
appropriate circumstance.  
 
It is further my belief that since the Form 17.1, as presently issued, does not contain the 
information necessary for a reasonable person in the position of the credit provider to come to 
the conclusion that the consumer is unequivocally stating an inability to pay one or more of 
61 
 
his debts, it must of necessity mean that the simple issuance of Form 17.1 by a debt 
counsellor will not amount to an act of insolvency on behalf of the debtor. 
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